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Abstract
This Essay attempts to capture and describe the fundamental tension that now
exists in the Indian electoral funding system and considers the issues this tension
presents for electoral politics in general. Instead of building a case for, or against,
the constitutionality of the Electoral Bonds Scheme, this paper argues that the
Electoral Bonds Scheme has created a dystopic system for donations that lends itself
to no quick and simple remedy. The Electoral Bonds Scheme poses difficult questions
about whether the Parliament can remedy this situation or whether the situation is
remediable only by the Supreme Court.
To solve this dilemma, Part I deliberates upon the role that money plays in Indian
elections and the changes in the relative power of the political parties while
campaigning during elections after the introduction of the electoral bonds scheme.
Part II outlines and explores how today’s electoral donation system has completely
altered the balance of power into favouring the party of the incumbent government.
Finally, Part III discusses the dystopic effects of the imbalance of power the Supreme
Court has created in the electoral system through its refusal to either adjudicate
upon, or grant a stay order, and the barriers to remedying this problematic system
by restoring electoral equilibrium.
Keywords: Equilibrium, Electoral Bonds Scheme, Donations, Supreme Court,
Parliament.
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INTRODUCTION
“Any attempt on the part of anyone to finance a political party is likely to contaminate
the well springs of democracy. Democracy would be vitiated if results were to be
arrived at not on their merits, but because money played a part in the bringing
about of those decisions. The form and trappings of democracy may continue, but
the spirit underlying democratic institutions will disappear. History of democracy
has proved that in other countries democracy has been smothered by big business and
money bags playing an important part in the working of democratic institutions,
and it is the duty not only of politicians, not only of citizens, but also of a Court of
law, to the extent that it has got the power to prevent any inﬂuence being exercised
upon the voter which is an improper inﬂuence or which may be looked at from any
point of view as a corrupt inﬂuence.”1
Chief Justice Mohammed Ali Currim Chagla
Introduced by the Finance Act 2017,2 notified by the Ministry of Finance in
20183 and challenged in the case of Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of
India,4 the Electoral Bonds Scheme became a matter that was frequently debated
and deliberated among the legal scholars, politicians and citizens. While
the Government batted for the Electoral Bonds Scheme as a much required
electoral reform to promote transparency in electoral funding, its adversaries
treated the Electoral Bonds Scheme as a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a creature

1
2

3

4

Jayantilal Ranchchoddas Koticha v Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 604
Ministry of Law and Justice, ‘The Finance Act 2017’ (The Gazette of India, 31 March
2017)
<https://www.civilaviation.gov.in/sites/default/files/MoL%26amp%3BJ%20
%28Legislative%20Deptt%29%20The%20Finance%20Act%20.pdf> accessed 08
February 2020
Ministry of Finance, ‘Electoral Bond Scheme 2018’ (Press Information Bureau
Government of India, 02 January 2018) <https://pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.
aspx?relid=193519>accessed 08 February 2020
W.P (Civil) No. 880 of 2017
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which would ultimately overwhelm and throttle democracy.5 Alas, when the
Electoral Bonds Scheme was challenged before the Supreme Court, the Court
has, time and again, evaded adjudicating upon the constitutional validity or
granting a stay order against the Electoral Bonds Scheme. In the eyes of the
Chief Justice’s court, the weighty issues involved in the matter could not be
adjudicated within the limited time available.6
The gross effect of the Supreme Court’s refusal to grant stay order on the
Electoral Bonds Scheme was seen in the colossal increase of funding received
by the incumbent government’s political party – leaving the opposition and
other political parties way behind. This was because the Electoral Bonds
Scheme created a quid pro quo relationship between the government and the
donors, ensuring that the incumbent government always received a lion’s share
of electoral funding.
The Electoral Bonds Scheme effectively opening up the floodgates of money
for one political party, while leaving behind all other political parties,7 led to
the complete change in relative resources available to the party belonging to the
incumbent government and the rest of the parties. What further exacerbated
this disproportionate funding received by the political parties were, firstly, the
amendment to Section 29C of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
which now excludes the disclosure of donations received through the means of

5

6

7

Gautam Bhatia, 'Supreme Court’s interim order on electoral bonds is disappointing'
(Hindustan Times, 13 April 2019) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/sc-s-interimorder-on-electoral-bonds-is-disappointing/story-yIzsFRChHZMoMZwbezMk4N.html>
accessed 08 February 2020
Editorial, 'Return of bonds: On Supreme Court refusal to stay electoral bonds scheme'
(The Hindu, 22 January 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/return-ofbonds-on-supreme-court-refusal-to-stay-electoral-bonds-scheme/article30618412.ece>
accessed 08 February 2020
Chart 1: EBS Donations to Political Parties, 'Decoding India’s electoral bonds scheme'
(Observer Research Foundation 30 November 2019) <https://www.orfonline.org/expertspeak/decoding-indias-electoral-bonds-scheme-58260/> accessed 08 February 2020
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electoral bonds8; secondly, an amendment to Section 13A of the Income Tax
Act, 1961, which now exempts political parties from maintaining a record of the
donations made through electoral bonds9 and, thirdly, an amendment to Section
182 of Companies Act, 2013, which now does not levy any restrictions or
prohibitions on the companies with respect to making political contributions,10
and lastly, the amendment to the Section 2(1)(j)(vi) of Foreign Contributions
Regulation Act, 2010, which now allows foreign companies to monetarily
influence the Indian elections and policies11; thereby, ensuring that not only
would the incumbent government’s party receive huge disproportionate sums
of electoral funding, but also escape from any form of accountability for the
funds received through the Electoral Bonds.
This Essay attempts to capture and describe the fundamental tension that now
exists in the Indian electoral funding system and considers the issues this tension
presents for electoral politics in general. Instead of building a case for, or against,
the constitutionality of the Electoral Bonds Scheme in being introduced as a
Money Bill under Article 11012 of the Constitution, or about the amendments
being violative of the principles of ‘free and fair elections,’ this paper argues that
the Electoral Bonds Scheme has created a dystopic system for donations that
lends itself to no quick and simple remedy. The Electoral Bonds Scheme poses
difficult questions about whether the Parliament can remedy this situation or
whether the situation is remediable only by the Supreme Court.
To solve this dilemma, Part I deliberates upon the role that money plays in
Indian elections and the changes in the relative power of the political parties
while campaigning during elections after the introduction of the electoral
bonds scheme.

8
9
10
11
12

Representation of the People Act 1951, s 29C
Income Tax Act 1961, s 13A
Companies Act 2013, s 182
Foreign Contributions Regulation Act 2010, s 2(1)(j)(vi)
Constitution of India 1951, art. 110
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Part II outlines and explores how today’s electoral donation system has
completely altered the balance of power into favouring the party of the
incumbent government.
Finally, Part III discusses the dystopic effects of the imbalance of power the
Supreme Court has created in the electoral system through its refusal to either
adjudicate upon or grant a stay order, and the barriers to remedying this
problematic system by restoring electoral equilibrium.
I. ESTABLISHING THE RELATIVE POWER BETWEEN MONEY
AND POLITICAL PARTIES: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF
MONEY IN INDIAN ELECTIONS.
A. The Role of Money in Elections
In order to understand the role of money in campaigning during elections,
one must understand the structure of the electoral campaigning procedure.
The democratic process of elections to fill the seats of the state assemblies
and the parliament includes the candidates belonging to different political
parties campaigning against their rival candidates and parties. This process
would require the political cadre of the party, which is mainly constituted of
the grassroots workers, to campaign for their party candidate, and it would
require money to run an effective campaign. Few party workers would agree
to campaign without taking money as remuneration.
Adding on to it, the modern day campaigning is not just limited to the door to
door campaigning and giving public speeches, but includes the advertisements
made through digital and print media, running a research team for countering
the narratives and fake propaganda by the rival parties, running a social media
team, etc.
Further, the decisive role that money plays during the elections has been time
and again testified to by the Former Chief Election Commissioners (CECs).
Former Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. N. Gopalaswamy, remarked that the
196
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Election Commission which was able to contain the muscle power in elections
had miserably failed to do so in the case of the money power,13 and former
Chief Election Commissioner, Mr. S. Y. Quraishi, acknowledged that the
horrors of the money power during elections are obvious, and the overarching
influence of money in politics is a blot on the principle of fairness, freeness
and transparency which are the cornerstones of the Constitution. He further
opined that the increasing role of money power in determining the outcome of
elections has had a rippling effect on the legislators by making them lethargic
and inactive when it comes to formulation of policies.14
Further, to statistically substantiate the decisive role of money in elections,
eminent journalist P. Sainath in his article, titled ‘The medium, message and
the money,’15 has highlighted that a candidate with a worth of 5 crores was
75 times more likely to win an election over a candidate who was worth less
than 10 lakhs.
Such are the realities of modern day campaigning, which requires incurring
huge costs to run an effective campaign.16 However, there is no straight jacket
formula to ascertain what would be an ideal amount of money that is actually
required to run an effective modern day election campaign because of the very
nature of elections being a costly affair.

13 N Vittal. 'Tackling Money Power' (Pune Mirror, 5 July 2009) <https://punemirror.
indiatimes.com/columns/columnists/Tackling-money-power/articleshow/32561399.
cms> accessed 08 February 2020
14 A CMS Report, 'Poll Expenditure, The 2019 Elections' (CMS Research House, 30 May
2019) <http://cmsindia.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/Poll-Expenditure-the-2019elections-cms-report.pdf> accessed 08 February 2020
15 P. Sainath, 'The medium, message and the money' (The Hindu, 26 October 2009)
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/columns/sainath/The-medium-message-and-themoney/article13666073.ece accessed 08 February 2020
16 See Association for Democratic Reforms & National Election Watch, ‘Analysis of Funds
Collected and Expenditure Incurred by National Political Parties – Lok Sabha 2004, 2009
& 2014’ (Association for Democratic Rights, 2 March 2015) <https://adrindia.org/researchand-report/political-party-watch/combined-reports/2015/analysis-fundscollected-and>
accessed 08 February 2020
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B. The Effect of Electoral Bonds Scheme
In light of the decisive role that money plays in elections, it became pivotal
in the words of former Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, to “tackle the
growth of money power in elections in order to maintain the health of our (India’s)
democratic polity.”17 Against this backdrop, the finance ministry introduced the
electoral bonds scheme which was proclaimed as an alternative system devised
to clean up the political funding system and establish a transparent mechanism
for funding elections.18 However, the major drawback of the Electoral Bonds
Scheme was the abandonment of the disclosure requirements for donations
made thorough Electoral Bonds, which were put in to incentivise and ensure
that unclean money from unidentifiable sources are not able to enter electoral
funding.
It is paradoxical that the Electoral Bonds Scheme that was intended at securing
accountability and transparency in the system effectively crippled the system
into ensuring that the incumbent government receives a major chunk of electoral
donations through electoral bonds. The research conducted by the think tank –
‘Factly’ uncovered the dominant trend of the incumbent government’s political
party always receiving donations that were way ahead of the rest of the parties
combined, as shown in the figure below.19
Then came the challenge to the Electoral Bonds Scheme in the case of Association
for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India,20 a case which would forever alter the
17 Niranjan Sahoo, ‘Towards public financing of elections and political parties in India:
Lessons from global experiences’, Observer Research Foundation, 20 November 2017)
<https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-public-financing-elections-political-partiesindia-lessons-global-experiences/> accessed 08 February 2020
18 Arun Jaitley, 'Why Electoral Bonds are Necessary' (7 January 2018) <https://www.
facebook.com/notes/arun-jaitley/why-electoral-bonds-are-necessary/729708620551022/>
accessed 08 February 2020
19 Bharath Kancharla, 'Income of National Parties soars in 2018-19, thanks to Electoral
Bonds' (FACTLY, 11 January 2020) <https://factly.in/income-of-national-parties-soarsin-2018-19-thanks-to-electoral-bonds/> accessed 08 February 2020
20 W.P (Civil) No. 880 of 2017.
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jurisprudential discourse on the electoral campaign financing. The court laid
down its seminal judgement which created a dichotomy in electoral donation
by evading answering the issues pertaining to the constitutional validity of the
electoral bonds scheme, yet issuing an order mandating the political parties to
furnish the account of funding received through electoral bonds to the Election
Commission in sealed covers. However, the Court effectively upheld the
electoral bonds scheme by virtue of it evading answering the issues pertaining
to the constitutional validity, denying the stay order and, lastly, ordering the
political parties to furnish the details to the election commission, which would
not be made public during the course of elections and, thereby, enabling the
government to enforce the electoral bonds scheme to its fullest efficacy.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF ELECTORAL DONATIONS AND
FUNDING
As a result of the Supreme Court’s denial in granting a stay order on electoral
bonds scheme, today’s electoral donation system essentially allows anonymous
persons, corporations, including foreign companies, to fund elections in
199
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unlimited amounts to equip the political party which has their best interests
at heart to win elections. This serves a far different purpose, now, than that
advocated by the government, i.e., to reform the electoral donation system and
promote transparency. As one observer noted: “the early trends, as revealed
from RTI information and quantum of donations (Rs 6128 crore in just
18 months) flowing via this channel, point to very a serious challenge
facing India’s electoral democracy and nature of politics. In effect, the
government has legalised crony-capitalism in the country’s democratic
system.” 21
Parties are now viewed with, at least, as much scepticism as are other
invisible hands that have influence over the elected officials. 22 Rather
than the parties providing a vital link between the elected officials and
the interests of voters, they now pose a daunting threat to the interests of
the voters, as the big corporate donors have their own special interests. 23
The integrity and independence of the parties have been compromised
by the special interest groups such as corporates who donate huge chunks
of funds, because the special interest groups now can donate unlimited
amounts to a political party which would agree to meet their selfish
interests, over the general welfare of the people, for the sake of receiving
funds for campaigning.24 Since the parties now depend substantially upon
the corporate donations, the issues of national interest such as the issues
pertaining to farmers, economy, employment and poverty, to name a few,
will no longer have an edge over the crony interests in the elections. 25
21 Niranjan Sahoo, 'Decoding India’s electoral bonds scheme' (Observer Research Foundation,
30 November 2019) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decoding-indias-electoralbonds-scheme-58260/> accessed 08 February 2020
22 See James Madison, ‘The Federalist Papers No. 10’ (Yale Law School: The Avalon Project,
23 November 1787) <https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed10.asp> accessed 08
February 2020
23 See John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in
America (1995) 68-92.
24 Davis v FEC, [2008] 128 S. CL 2774.
25 See Samuel Issachroff & Pamela S. Karlan, ‘The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform’
(1999) 77 TEX LR 1705, 1708.
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Whatever values the government pursued in crafting the electoral bonds scheme,
they have been tacitly upheld by the Court’s subsequent rulings. Once the
Electoral Bonds Scheme passed the judicial hurdles and came into existence,
it was observed that the incumbent government’s political party received such
disproportionate sums of donations, so that the sum of all the other political
parties’ combined together was not even half as much as that of the incumbent
government’s party. The sheer disparity among the donations received by the
political parties through means of electoral bonds is best represented by the
graphical representation below:

Source: Computed from ADR Data (based on March 2018 tranche) 26
This graphical representation portrays a complete paralysis of equilibrium in
the electoral funding system.
There are endless possibilities for how to redesign the electoral bonds scheme
and the system of electoral donations. A full examination of them is outside
the scope of this paper, but there are important questions to ask in considering
26 Chart 1: EBS Donations to Political Parties, 'Decoding India’s electoral bonds
scheme' (Observer Research Foundation, Observer Research Foundation 30 November
2019) <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/decoding-indias-electoral-bondsscheme-58260/> accessed 08 February 2020.
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the next steps. In reforming the system, we must ask what roles we want the
different actors, political and non political, to play.
Some would argue that the State funding of elections is a good thing, so that it
would bring the issues pertaining to the welfare of the people to the forefront
of election campaigning as well as eliminate the role of the corporate vested
interests in influencing the outcome of elections.
This method of State financing of elections would be more persuasive if,
practically, the economy of the country would be conducive to the total funding
of elections, such that the political parties would be fully prohibited from taking
donations from private persons.27 Some would still argue that the electoral
bonds scheme and the electoral donations by individual persons are essential to
reduce the black money that gets circulated in the form of cash during election
campaigning, so we should not be concerned about any imbalance between the
political parties. This is a valid argument coming from a principled position,
but it does not address the concern this paper raises: the resulting power
imbalance between the incumbent government’s party and all other parties
in the electoral market. To put it in the words of Professor Kathleen Sullivan,
one can be pro speech libertarian28 vide the uncapped electoral bonds scheme
and, also, be concerned about the power imbalance among actors and entities
within the realm of the campaign. The realisation of these concerns is a must
for establishing a level playing ground for the other political parties as well as
putting an estoppel over the illegitimate and excessive funding of elections.29

27 Government of India, Indrajit Gupta Committee Report on State Funding of Elections
(Committee on The State Funding of Elections, December 1998)
<http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/erreports/Indrajit%20Gupta%20Committee%20Report.
pdf>accessed 08 February 2020.
28 Kathleen M Sullivan, ‘The Supreme Court, 2009 Term – Comment: Two Concepts of Freedom
of Speech’ (2010) 124 Harv. L. Rev 143.
29 Government of India, 'Ethics in Governance' (Second Administrative Reforms Commission,
January 2007) <https://darpg.gov.in/sites/default/files/ethics4.pdf>accessed 08
February 2020.
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III. RESTORING ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM?
The Supreme Court of India has shied away from answering the critical
questions such as the constitutionality of the electoral bonds scheme and of
the amendments made through the Finance Act, 2017, but surprisingly it
also denied the granting of a stay order against the electoral bonds scheme.30
However, as a measure to strike a balance and to avoid one single party having
an unfair advantage in electoral donations, Supreme Court has mandated
the political parties to furnish the funds received by them to the Election
Commission of India. Perhaps, establishing an equilibrium was its aim, or
perhaps not, but the refusal to grant the stay order has an impeding effect on
establishing any sort of equilibrium in donations.
A. Can the Parliament Re-establish Electoral Equilibrium?
It appears that the Parliament should take the initiative to address this problem
in good faith. But, the only way in which the Parliament can bring in an
equilibrium in electoral donations would be through passing laws that are
parimateria to the laws that existed prior to the amendments brought through
the Finance Act, 2017. This road is quite bumpy, as the Parliament has spent a
significant amount of energy in breathing life into the electoral bonds scheme,
and it was a well planned and executed policy of the government, which was
published a year before the amended law was passed.31
It is sine qua non to note that the government was itself of the view that the
electoral bonds scheme is a much required electoral reform which promotes
clean money and transparent funding mechanism in the system of political

30 W.P (Civil) No. 880 of 2017.
31 Gautam Bhatia, ‘Judicial Evasion and the Electoral Bonds Case' (Indian Constitutional
Law and Philosophy, 13 April 2019)
<https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/04/13/judicial-evasion-and-the-electoralbonds-case/> accessed 08 February 2020
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funding.32 Therefore, expecting the government to change its stance on electoral
bonds would be a futile exercise. Even if the government reintroduces the earlier
caps that were levied on political donations due to the sheer virtue of people
clamouring for change, it would be very undesirable to bring back the system
of making cash donations using black money.
It is further unlikely that sitting legislators would have a personal interest in
abolishing the electoral bonds system or levying caps on the political donations
made through electoral bonds, since doing so would sacrifice some of their
incumbent’s advantage.33 It is also ironical that any political attempt to abolish
the dubious framework of electoral bonds scheme will itself be affected
significantly by large donors who have vested interests in retaining the electoral
bonds scheme.34
Perhaps, one may deliberate that the electoral bonds scheme can be overturned
by a change in the political scenario when the government of the day changes.
But, here lies the irony that even when there is a change in the regime, the
attempt to overturn the electoral bond scheme will be affected a great deal by
the large donors who would have vested interests in retaining this framework.35
Therefore, the answer is no, the parliament cannot re-establish the electoral
equilibrium.

32 Arun Jaitley, 'Electoral bonds aimed at checking use of black money in elections' (livemint,
7 April 2019) <https://www.livemint.com/elections/lok-sabha-elections/electoral-bondsaimed-at-checking-use-of-black-money-in-elections-arun-jaitley-1554640929741.html>
accessed 08 February 2020
33 See, Peter J Wallison & Joel M Gora, ‘Better Parties, Better Government’ (2005) 47-48.
34 Udit Bhatia, ‘Electoral Bonds and the Political Party as a Vehicle of Representation' (Indian
Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 18 April 2019) <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.
com/2019/04/18/electoral-bonds-and-the-political-party-as-a-vehicle-of-representation/>
accessed 08 February 2020
35 Udit Bhatia, ‘Electoral Bonds and the Political Party as a Vehicle of Representation'
(Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 18 April 2019)
<https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/04/18/electoral-bonds-and-the-politicalparty-as-a-vehicle-of-representation/> accessed 08 February 2020
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B. Can the Court Re-establish Electoral Equilibrium?
1. The Government (Attempt to) Strike Back: In Association for Democratic
Reforms v. Union of India,36 the government has made its submission
against the challenge to the electoral bonds scheme, but it has not yet
been successful in persuading the Court to declare that the electoral bonds
scheme is constitutional. Attorney General K. K. Venugopal argued before
the Court that the electoral bond scheme did not violate the right to know
under the Article 19(1) of the Constitution37 because, in a system where
there is no State funding of elections, the protection of the donors’ identity
must be maintained. Further, the scheme would help in eliminating black
money from elections.38 However, the Supreme Court took a neutral stance
by not deciding upon the constitutionality of the scheme, yet ordering the
political parties to furnish the donations received through electoral bonds to
the Election Commission in sealed covers.39 Regardless of this, the Court’s
denial in granting a stay order would tantamount to tacitly upholding the
scheme.
2. An Unlikely Resolution: Embrace the precedent set in Raj Narain case: In
the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain,40 the Court had held that
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and
expression to all citizens in addition to protecting the rights of the citizens
to know, the right to receive information regarding matters of public
concern. However, it is very unlikely that the Supreme Court will extend
the applicability of the ‘right to know’ to the electoral bond scheme, because
36 W.P (Civil) No. 880 of 2017
37 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, [1975] AIR 865
38 Association for Democratic Reforms and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. [2017] W.P (Civil)
No. 880
39 Supreme Court Order, ‘Association for Democratic Reforms. v Union of India’ ([2017]
W.P (Civil) No. 880) <https://scobserver-production.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/
case_document/document_upload/741/16902_2015_Order_12-Apr-2019.pdf> accessed
08 February 2020
40 State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain, [1975] AIR 865
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to do so would require revisiting of its earlier jurisprudence on the matter
wherein twice it has denied even granting a stay order as an interim relief.
Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the Court will actually take positive
measures to regulate the donations received through the electoral bonds
to strike a balance in the system of political funding.
Embracing the Raj Narain case would be a radical departure from the
current jurisprudence of the Court not fully deciding the case on merits,
but buying time as a mode of judicial evasion wherein the judiciary sleeps
over the case and, thereby, effectively upholds the law in a very tacit manner.
Abandoning this practice of judicial evasion would be a bold step towards
reclaiming the spirit of the activist judiciary of the 1950s. In the case of
Jayantilal Ranchchoddas Koticha v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd.,41 the Court
had remarkably held that there is an inherent danger in permitting private
funding to the political parties. Chief Justice M. C. Chagla remarked that
“Any attempt on the part of anyone to finance a political party is likely to
contaminate the very springs of democracy. Democracy would be vitiated if
results were to be arrived at not on their merits, but because money played
a part in the bringing about of those decisions. History of democracy
has proved that in other countries democracy has been smothered by
big business and money bags playing an important part in the working
of democratic institutions, and it is the duty not only of politicians, not
only of citizens, but also of a Court of law, to the extent that it has got the
power, to prevent any influence being exercised upon the voter which is
an improper influence or which may be looked at from any point of view
as a corrupt influence.”42
This precedence set by Chief Justice Chagla’s Court was adhered to in the
Court’s jurisprudence for the past 15 years. For example, in the landmark
case of Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms, the court held
that the public had a ‘right to know’ which included the right to hold
41 Jayantilal Ranchchoddas Koticha v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., [1957] 27 Comp Cas 604
42 Id.
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opinion and acquire information, because a successful democracy strives
towards an aware citizenry, and misinformation or non-information of any
kind will create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce.43
However, the departure from the precedence set by Chief Justice Chagla’s
court was evident when Chief Justice Bobde joined Former Chief Justice
Gogoi in concurrence to deny the stay order on the electoral bonds scheme.
It is harder to surmise Chief Justice Bobde’s and Former Chief Justice
Gogoi’s positions on the constitutionality of the electoral bonds scheme in
the light of their positions taken in the case challenging the constitutional
validity of the electoral bonds scheme, especially because the case was
initially filed in early 2018, right after the electoral bonds scheme was passed
as a law, yet the position taken by Former Chief Justice Gogoi in the case
was of there being very little time for the Court to adjudicate upon the
matter. Six long months later, Chief Justice Bobde was still of the opinion
that there was once again very limited time available to adjudicate upon
the constitutionality of the electoral bond scheme. This position taken time
and again serves as a reminder that to deliberate that the Court will revisit
its stance in the light of the jurisprudence set by Chief Justice Chagla or
Raj Narain judgement is a farfetched dream that cannot be reckoned upon.
3. A Third Route for the Court: The Court may still have a third path to
restore the electoral equilibrium. Recall the order passed by Former Chief
Justice Gogoi to ensure that no single party takes an arbitrary advantage
of the electoral bond scheme. It required the political parties to furnish
the details of the funds received by them through the means of electoral
bonds. Full disclosure about funding information may either deter quid
pro quo transactions or nudge voters against electing candidates who have
used or are likely to use their public office for quid pro quo arrangements.
Therefore, funding information is relevant information for the voters.44
43 Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms [2002] 3 SCR 294
44 Aradhya Sethia, ‘Where's The Money?: Paths And Pathologies Of The Law Of Party Funding’
(2019) Vol. 1 NJLS 86, 107
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However, the efficacy of the ‘disclosures by the political parties’ type
system, as devised by the Court, depends upon the power of the Election
Commission to impose strict penalties or disqualify the political parties
for non-disclosure or discrepancies in the details of funds received through
the electoral bonds. But, alas, the Election Commission of the present day
is not just a toothless tiger, but even a tiger which errs on the side of the
government of the day.45
Thence, the only middle path available with the Court to re-establish
equilibrium in the political donations received through the electoral bonds
scheme would be as follows –
i. Upholding the electoral bonds scheme but striking down the
amendments to the Representation of the People Act, 1951, Income
Tax Act, 1961, Companies Act, 2013, and Foreign Contributions
Regulation Act, 2010, so as to restore the accountability that the
political parties owed to the voters in the interest of democracy.
This would restore the voters’ right to know; thereby, restoring the
equilibrium in the system, because now the voter will know who has
funded the political party that is forming the government and what
are the triggers and the tugs and pulls that the government is being
influenced by, while formulating its policies.
ii. The Right to Information Act, 2005, must be made applicable to
the political parties in the interest of the voters’ right to know. Any
reformative decision by the Court would remain a writ in water, if the
Court does not extend the applicability of the RTI Act to the political
parties, because RTI has time and again proved itself to be a valiant
weapon against the excesses and corruption of the governmental
institutions. RTI enables the public welfare spirited persons, such as
Common Cause and Association for Democratic Reforms, to seek
information on the donations received and the spending done by the
45 Staff Reporter, 'Election Commission acting in favour of BJP' (The Hindu, 04 April
2019) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Madurai/election-commission-actingin-favour-of-bjp/article26736446.ece> accessed 08 February 2020
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political parties during the elections. All of such information would
play a key role in providing the voter with a genuine opportunity to
make an informed decision.
•

iii. There must be a reintroduction of the provisions that omitted the
sections which promoted caps on anonymous and corporate donations
or, at best, there must be a complete ban on anonymous, corporate and
foreign donations, so that the invisible hands will no longer dictate
the policies of the government. It does not come as a surprise that the
government chose to provide cuts on corporate tax despite the public
of the country being in desperate need of relief from the government’s
end.46

•

Further, it can be reasonably expected that as and when the court takes
up this approach, the issue of freedom of speech and expression would
be likely to come up. In a similar instance, the Supreme Court of the
United States, while dealing with campaign finance laws that imposed
ban on corporate donations, held that the ban was against the free
speech clause of the first amendment rights.47

•

However, the judgement in the Citizens United case, when considered
in the Indian context, would hold a persuasive value, but it would
still not be sufficient because it would be overridden by the Indian
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of freedom of speech and
expression under the Constitution of India. Firstly, freedom of speech
and expression under the Constitution of India is limited to the citizens
only. In the case of The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors.
v. The Commercial Tax Officer,48 the Supreme Court of India held that:

46 MG Arun, ‘Why corporate tax cuts may not bring down consumer prices’ (India Today,
25 September 2019) <https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/corporatetax-cut-consumer-price-1602907-2019-09-25> accessed 08 February 2020
47 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,558 U.S. 310 (2010)
48 The State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. v. The Commercial Tax Officer &
Ors.,1963 AIR 1811
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“The precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States which hold
that corporations are citizens of the State of incorporation for purposes
of federal jurisdiction cannot be followed in India. The diversity of
citizenship which has led to such rulings does not exist in India. As
a corporation is a separate entity from its members, it is not possible
to pierce the veil of incorporation to determine the citizenship of its
members in order to give the corporation the benefit of Art. 19.”
Secondly, Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India, unlike the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, provides for a
reasonable restriction on freedom of speech and expression. Further,
this point can be read with the preamble of the Constitution which
intends to establish justice – social, economic and political. In the light
of the same, it will only be reasonable to restrict the corporate funding
of elections, so as to protect and promote the economic and political
justice under the Constitution
In Kanwar Lal Gupta v. A. N. Chawla & Ors,49 in the context of limiting
election expenditure by political parties and their candidates, the Court
noted that:
“The other objective of limiting expenditure is to eliminate, as far
as possible, the influence of big money in the electoral process. If
there were no limit on expenditure, political parties would go all out
for collecting contributions and, obviously, the largest contributions
would be from the rich and affluent who constitute but a fraction of
the electorate….”
Thus, imposition of strict caps or banning the anonymous, corporate
and foreign donations would clearly prevent the quid pro quo
relationship between the government and other entities that seldom
care for the larger interest of the nation and democracy in general.
49

Kanwar Lal Gupta v. A. N. Chawla & Ors. (1975) 3 SCC 646
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However, the barrier to this solution is that the Court has no say over
it as it is a policy matter.
iv. The concept of State funded elections may be introduced in India. It
might prove to be a radical measure because of the quantum of burden
that would be thrust upon the state exchequer to fund the elections.
Further, in theory, the benefits of State funded elections outweigh the
demerits of private funding of elections which has a very detrimental
effect at the very core of democracy. Private funding creates disparities
in the resources available in the hands of the political parties, and the
abundance of resources with one single party while the other political
parties are deprived of them, substantially, means a death knell to
democracy.50 However, while the state funding of elections in India
looks like a panacea, in practise, it may still not be enough to do away
with the imbalance in funding, because when the functioning of state
funded elections are examined across countries like Belgium, Denmark,
Canada, Germany, etc., state funding of elections have only been
successful when it is complemented with a strict compliance by the
political parties of disclosure norms and spending limits.51 In India,
the spending limits and disclosure norms have seldom been a deterrent
to the candidates from not complying with the spending limits. For
example, Former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee once stated that “Indian
politicians start their legislative careers with a lie – the false spending
returns they submit,”52 and the evidence of the same can be traced in
the independent reports which show that the candidate who can spend
50 Law Commission of India, (255th Report on Electoral Reforms, March 2015) 57
<http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/Report255.pdf> accessed 08 February 2020
51 Niranjan Sahoo, ‘Towards public financing of elections and political parties in India:
Lessons from global experiences,’ (Observer Research Foundation, 20 November, 2017)
<https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-public-financing-elections-political-partiesindia-lessons-global-experiences/> accessed 08 February 2020
52 Prof. Jagdeep S. Chhokar, “The charade of limits on election expenditure by candidates”
(Association for Democratic Reforms, 26 October 2020)<http://blog.adrindia.org/thecharade-of-limits-on-election-expenditure-by-candidates/> accessed 1 December 2020
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more would more likely win, with the 2004 Lok Sabha consisting of
30% of MPs whose net value was in crores, 2009 Lok Sabha consisting
of 58%, 2014 Lok Sabha consisting of 82% and 2019 Lok Sabha
consisting of a whopping 88% of MPs who had their income and value
in crores.53 Therefore, while a radical malady requires a radical remedy,
the evidence on the ground would point out that the radical remedy to
the imbalance in the electoral funding will ‘wither on the vine’ due to
the failure in the enforcement of the electoral spending limits. Lastly,
one more barrier to this solution is that the Court has no say over it,
as it is a policy matter.
v. The transformation of the institution of the Election Commission of
India into an independent organisation with the power to deregister the
political parties that do not disclose the account of funds received or
practice any kind of non-compliance with respect to the duty to disclose
is needed. The need to ensure appointment of Election Commissioners
on a non-partisan basis and to conduct an independent scrutiny on the
bank accounts of the political parties is required now, more than ever.54
However, neither the Court has any say over the transformation of the
Election Commission into an independent body, nor does the current
Election Commission seem any too keen on wanting institutional
autonomy and powers.
vi. The Court must mandate that the political funding should be a separate
head in the accounts and annual reports of a company. Further, any
donations made by the corporate must be processed digitally in the

53 Shelly Mahajan, ‘Election Campaign Expenditure in India: Trends and Challenges’,
(Association for Democratic Reforms)<https://adrindia.org/sites/default/files/
Election_Campaign_Expenditure_in_India_Trends_and_Challenges.pdf>
accessed 01 December 2020
54 Milan Vaishnav and Jagdeep Chhokar, ‘Have Electoral Bonds made a bad system worse?’,
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/06/have-electoral-bonds-made-bad-systemworse-pub-80519>accessed 03 December 2020
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interest of transparency.55 This will ensure transparency in the long
run. However, the barrier to this solution is that the Court has no say
over it, as it is a policy matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
After receiving an overwhelming amount of donations in the 2019 Lok Sabha
elections, the incumbent government changed their mind by extending the
Electoral Bonds Scheme as a medium for donations in the subsequent State
Assembly elections. With this government being unwilling to give up on its
incumbent’s advantage, it seems the time for making a decision on where to go
next with the electoral bonds scheme with respect to restoring the equilibrium
in the electoral donations should be imminent. But, the options for reform
remain drastically limited and potentially fatally flawed. So, we may be stuck
with this imbalanced electoral equilibrium of donations received by the political
parties until either the Parliament or the Court invents a way to work with, or
around, the Court’s jurisprudence on Electoral Bonds Scheme.

55 Milan Vaishnav, ‘Electoral Bonds: The Safeguards of Indian Democracy Are Crumbling,’
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/11/25/electoral-bonds-safeguards-of-indiandemocracy-are-crumbling-pub-80428 accessed 05 December 2020
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